We experimentally study the effects of sorting and communication in contests between
groups of heterogeneous players whose within-group efforts are perfect complements …

This paper investigates the optimal formation of teams in a tournament. A manager sorts four
workers---who differ in their productivity---into two teams. Workers on each team join forces …

We characterize the optimal prize allocation, namely the allocation that maximizes a group's
effectiveness, in a model of contests. The model has the following features:(i) it allows for …

This paper investigates the formation of teams in a contest. A manager sorts four workers—
who differ in their productivity—into two teams. Workers on each team join forces to produce …

We explore public randomization (Harris et al., 1995) in group contests and introduce group
public randomization equilibria (GPRE). We consider group all-pay auctions with weakest …

This paper studies how the success of a community in confrontation against an out-group
varies with its level of internal inequality. We present a model of conflict between two …

This paper is the first to study difference-form group contests, that is, contests fought among
groups where their probability of victory depends on the absolute difference of their effective …

This paper analyzes the occurrence of the group-size paradox in situations in which groups
compete for rents, allowing for degrees of rivalry of the rent among group members. We …

This paper investigates Tullock group contests with the possibility of a draw in which the
winner, if any, shares the prize with other players in his group, and each group's sharing rule …

We provide an evolutionary explanation for the well-established evidence of the existence of
in-group favoritism in intergroup conflict. Using a model of group contest for a (local) public …