A sender commissions a study to persuade a receiver but influences the report with some
probability. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to …

When does a Sender, in a Sender-Receiver game, strictly value commitment? In a setting
with finite actions and finite states, we establish that, generically, Sender values commitment …

I study the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly
attention effort. The sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific …

This paper explores the problem of mediated communication enhanced by money-burning
tactics for commitment power. In our model, the sender has state-independent preferences …

The following three chapters study the role of information transmission in monopolistic
markets. The first chapter models communication explicitly and examines the problem of a …

This dissertation consists of two independent essays. In the first essay, Coordination in
Complex Environments, I introduce a framework to study coordination in highly uncertain …

This paper revisits the classical monopolistic screening framework of Mussa and Rosen
(1978) to explore the effects of costly communication between sellers and buyers …