It pays to be a man: Rewards for leaders in a coordination game

PJ Grossman, C Eckel, M Komai, W Zhan - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2019 - Elsevier
We address gender differences in leader effectiveness and followers' perceptions of leaders'
effectiveness. Our experimental design removes gender-linked factors that might affect …

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

J Brandts, DJ Cooper, E Fatas - Experimental Economics, 2007 - Springer
We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial
incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the …

[HTML][HTML] Excludability: A laboratory study on forced ranking in team production

R Croson, E Fatas, T Neugebauer… - Journal of Economic …, 2015 - Elsevier
Exclusion has long been employed as a common disciplinary measure against defectors,
both at work and in social life. In this paper, we study the effect of excludability–exclusion of …

Near-efficient equilibria in contribution-based competitive grouping

A Gunnthorsdottir, R Vragov, S Seifert… - Journal of Public …, 2010 - Elsevier
We examine theoretically and experimentally how competitive contribution-based group
formation affects incentives to free-ride. We introduce a new formal model of social …

Assessing team performance: Moderating roles of transactive memory, hypercompetition, and emotional regulation

YH Tsai, SW Joe, ML Chen, CP Lin, HC Ma… - Human …, 2016 - Taylor & Francis
This study proposes a model based on transactive memory theory to analyze team
performance. In the proposed model, team performance is influenced by hypercompetition …

The effect of competition on tax compliance: The role of audit rules and shame

A Casagrande, D Di Cagno, A Pandimiglio… - Journal of Behavioral …, 2015 - Elsevier
Traditional models of tax enforcement assume that the decision to be tax compliant is the
result of an interaction between individual taxpayers and a dedicated tax agency. Evidence …

Group incentives or individual incentives? A real-effort weak-link experiment

S Bortolotti, G Devetag, A Ortmann - Journal of Economic Psychology, 2016 - Elsevier
Motivated by previous research on coordination problems and incentive design in
organizations, we compare group incentives and individual incentives in a new …

Antisocial punishment in two social dilemmas

E Fatas, G Mateu - Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 2015 - frontiersin.org
The effect of sanctions on cooperation depends on social and cultural norms. While free
riding is kept at bay by altruistic punishment in certain cultures, antisocial punishment …

Contribution games in networks

E Anshelevich, M Hoefer - Algorithmica, 2012 - Springer
We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a network has a budget of
effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on …

Matching, cardinal utility, and social welfare

E Anshelevich, S Das - ACM SIGECom Exchanges, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Matching markets have historically been an important topic in economics research. On the
positive (descriptive) side, researchers have modeled everything ranging from marriage …