It pays to be a man: Rewards for leaders in a coordination game
We address gender differences in leader effectiveness and followers' perceptions of leaders'
effectiveness. Our experimental design removes gender-linked factors that might affect …
effectiveness. Our experimental design removes gender-linked factors that might affect …
Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs
We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial
incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the …
incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the …
[HTML][HTML] Excludability: A laboratory study on forced ranking in team production
Exclusion has long been employed as a common disciplinary measure against defectors,
both at work and in social life. In this paper, we study the effect of excludability–exclusion of …
both at work and in social life. In this paper, we study the effect of excludability–exclusion of …
Near-efficient equilibria in contribution-based competitive grouping
A Gunnthorsdottir, R Vragov, S Seifert… - Journal of Public …, 2010 - Elsevier
We examine theoretically and experimentally how competitive contribution-based group
formation affects incentives to free-ride. We introduce a new formal model of social …
formation affects incentives to free-ride. We introduce a new formal model of social …
Assessing team performance: Moderating roles of transactive memory, hypercompetition, and emotional regulation
YH Tsai, SW Joe, ML Chen, CP Lin, HC Ma… - Human …, 2016 - Taylor & Francis
This study proposes a model based on transactive memory theory to analyze team
performance. In the proposed model, team performance is influenced by hypercompetition …
performance. In the proposed model, team performance is influenced by hypercompetition …
The effect of competition on tax compliance: The role of audit rules and shame
A Casagrande, D Di Cagno, A Pandimiglio… - Journal of Behavioral …, 2015 - Elsevier
Traditional models of tax enforcement assume that the decision to be tax compliant is the
result of an interaction between individual taxpayers and a dedicated tax agency. Evidence …
result of an interaction between individual taxpayers and a dedicated tax agency. Evidence …
Group incentives or individual incentives? A real-effort weak-link experiment
Motivated by previous research on coordination problems and incentive design in
organizations, we compare group incentives and individual incentives in a new …
organizations, we compare group incentives and individual incentives in a new …
Antisocial punishment in two social dilemmas
The effect of sanctions on cooperation depends on social and cultural norms. While free
riding is kept at bay by altruistic punishment in certain cultures, antisocial punishment …
riding is kept at bay by altruistic punishment in certain cultures, antisocial punishment …
Contribution games in networks
E Anshelevich, M Hoefer - Algorithmica, 2012 - Springer
We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a network has a budget of
effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on …
effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on …
Matching, cardinal utility, and social welfare
E Anshelevich, S Das - ACM SIGECom Exchanges, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Matching markets have historically been an important topic in economics research. On the
positive (descriptive) side, researchers have modeled everything ranging from marriage …
positive (descriptive) side, researchers have modeled everything ranging from marriage …