A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for
graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations …

We study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly
signals the actions played. We provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible …

Настоящая работа содержит результаты исследований теоретико-игровых моделей
динамических активных систем (ДАС). Приводится обзор известных результатов …

In many dynamic economic applications, the appropriate game theoretic structure is that of a
stochastic game. A folk theorem for such games is presented. The result subsumes a …

WE ARE CONCERNED here with perfect" folk theorems" for infinitely repeated games with
complete information. Folk theorems assert that any feasible and individually rational payoff …

A rigorous introduction to optimal control theory, with an emphasis on applications in
economics. This book bridges optimal control theory and economics, discussing ordinary …

Agents may contract some of their tasks to other agents even when they do not share a
common goal. An agent may try to contract some of the tasks that it cannot perform by itself …

THE STANDARD MODEL OF REPEATED STRATEGIC PLAY is a discretely repeated,
simultane-ous move game. This formulation assumes a perfect synchronization in the timing …

When players have identical time preferences, the set of feasible repeated game payoffs
coincides with the convex hull of the underlying stage‐game payoffs. Moreover, all feasible …

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, predictions are notoriously difficult. Recently, however,
Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011)—henceforth, BOS—showed that experimental …