We propose an economic framework for determining the optimal allocation of a scarce
supply of vaccines that become gradually available during a public health crisis, such as the …

We consider a platform's problem of collecting data from privacy sensitive users to estimate
an underlying parameter of interest. We formulate this question as a Bayesian-optimal …

Many scarce public resources are allocated at below-market-clearing prices and sometimes
for free. Such “nonmarket” mechanisms sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially …

Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly
matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient …

We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second-price auction.
The seller faces a trade-off: more information improves the efficiency of the allocation but …

We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services
catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and …

We study the design of a decentralized two-sided matching market in which agents' search
is guided by the platform. Each agent is of one of finitely many types and has (potentially …

We study the optimal design of a queueing system when agents' arrival and servicing are
governed by a general Markov process. The designer of the system chooses entry and exit …

We study the matching of jobs to workers in a queue, eg a ridesharing platform dispatching
drivers to pick up riders at an airport. Under FIFO dispatching, the heterogeneity in trip …

Effective patient-provider communication is essential for providing functional patient-
centered care. Research in the Medical and Operations Management (OM) literature has …