This paper considers firms' incentives to merge under imperfect competition, where we allow
for product differentiation, cost asymmetries, and pollution intensities (green and brown …

We analyze how environmental taxes should be optimally levied in a sequential game in
which regulators and firms face costs uncertainties. First, the regulator chooses the intensity …

This paper considers a polluting firm, subject to environmental policy, who seeks to deter the
entry of potential competitors. We investigate under which conditions firm profits are …

This paper considers firms' incentives to merge under duopoly, where we allow for product
differentiation, cost asymmetries, and pollution intensities (green and brown goods). We first …

This paper investigates the effect of monopoly subsidies on entry deterrence. We consider a
potential entrant who observes two signals: the subsidy set by the regulator and the output …

This paper considers firms' incentives to merge under duopoly, where we allow for product
differentiation, cost asymmetries, and pollution intensities (green and brown goods). We first …

Procurement auctions are often used to conserve territories rich in biodiversity, or protect
endangered species. Examples include the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the …

This paper considers incentives of firms to merge under duopoly, where we allow for product
differentiation, cost asymmetries, and pollution intensities (green and brown goods). We first …