The aim of general purpose financial reporting is to provide information that is useful to
investors, lenders, and other creditors. With this goal, regulators have tended to mandate …

Building upon the premise that, under certain conditions, the ability of the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) to pressure the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is limited, we develop a measure …

We examine how financial managers' willingness to engage in unethical pro-organizational
behavior depends on various individual and organizational characteristics. Using survey …

We study a corporate board tasked with monitoring a firm's CEO and providing incrementally
decision-relevant information. The board has both compensation and non-pecuniary …

Firms compensate managers to maximize shareholder value, yet these same incentives
affect bondholder risk. We investigate the relation between executive equity pay and the cost …

Although internal control over financial reporting has gained increasing regulatory attention,
its enforcement is far from perfect; thus, firm‐specific incentives to management become …

This study evaluates how incentive conflict between CEOs and CFOs, defined as the
disparity in risk-taking incentives between the two executives, impacts corporate decision …

Boards can learn about the environment of their firms through information gathering and
communicating with the CEO. In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley environment, some boards have …

The adoption of innovative technologies holds both promise and risk. We focus on the
voluntary adoption of innovative financial reporting and disclosure technologies (IFRDTs) …

While there is scarce empirical research on the relationship between valuation and
stewardship uses of accounting information, existing studies on the basis of US data show a …