The paper surveys the experimental literature on centralized matching markets, covering
school choice and college admissions models. In the school choice model, one side of the …

Although many centralized school assignment systems use the strategically simple deferred-
acceptance mechanism, applicants often make dominated choices. Using administrative …

A mechanism is said to be strategy-proof if no agent has an incentive to misrepresent her
true preferences. This property is considered highly desirable for mechanisms that are used …

Organizations often require agents' private information to achieve critical goals such as
efficiency or revenue maximization, but frequently it is not in the agents' best interest to …

We test experimentally the Gale–Shapley Deferred Acceptance mechanism versus two
versions of the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism, in which students make …

The rational choice framework for modeling matching markets has been tremendously
useful in guiding the design of school-assignment systems. Despite this success, a large …

When participating in school choice, students often spend substantial effort acquiring
information about schools. We investigate how two popular mechanisms incentivize …

We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley, 1962 mechanism, which is utilized in a wide
set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) …

This paper studies the implementation of quotas in matching markets. In a controlled
laboratory environment, we compare the performance of two university admissions …

We run a field experiment to test the truth-telling rates of the theoretically strategy-proof Top
Trading Cycles mechanism (TTC) under different information conditions. First, we asked first …