Food quality: The design of incentive contracts

RE Goodhue - Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ., 2011 - annualreviews.org
Quality considerations are increasingly important drivers of production and coordination
choices for players in the agrofood chain. Incentive contracts between farmers and …

Contracts and quality in the California winegrape industry

RE Goodhue, DM Heien, H Lee, DA Sumner - Review of Industrial …, 2003 - Springer
We analyze the relationship between product quality and contractingchoices using the
results of a survey of California winegrape growers. Growers who produce high-quality …

Economics of agricultural supply chain design: A portfolio selection approach

X Du, L Lu, T Reardon… - American Journal of …, 2016 - Wiley Online Library
Agrifood firms in a globalizing and competitive market, both in developing and developed
countries, often undertake innovations in products and technologies. Innovators such as …

Risk preferences, transaction costs, and choice of marketing contracts: Evidence from a choice experiment with fresh vegetable producers

M Vassalos, W Hu, T Woods, J Schieffer… - …, 2016 - Wiley Online Library
Growers' preferences for a number of marketing contract attributes, as well as the effect of
growers' risk aversion levels on the choice of marketing contracts, were examined with the …

Agricultural contracts: Data and research needs

B Hueth, E Ligon, C Dimitri - American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2007 - JSTOR
Though the use of contracts in the US agri-culture is not a new phenomenon, there is new
interest in both the extent and consequences of their use. Some useful data regarding the …

[PDF][PDF] Vertical relationships and food supply chain coordination: The case of processing tomato sector in Algeria

F BRABEZ, MA Benmehaia - New Medit: Mediterranean Journal …, 2018 - newmedit.iamb.it
This paper analyzes the vertical relationship between growers and processors in the
Algerian tomato processing industry. We use extensive data on production contract …

Do incentives for quality matter?

C Alexander, RE Goodhue… - Journal of Agricultural and …, 2007 - cambridge.org
We use an unusual dataset involving 14 tomato growers over 4 years to analyze the effect of
incentive contracts on behavior in a fixed effects econometric model. We find that growers …

Does haste always make waste? Service quantity, service quality, and incentives in speed-intensive service firms

C Song, S Jang, J Wiggins, E Nowlin - Service Business, 2019 - Springer
Research demonstrates a tradeoff between service quantity and service quality that creates
a tension for firms who wish to incentivize both aspects of service performance. We propose …

The relationship between product quality and transaction costs with vertical coordination in DOC [Qualified Designation of Origin] Rioja winegrape industry

M Fernández-Olmos, JR Martínez… - Spanish Journal of …, 2009 - sjar.revistas.csic.es
This paper analyzes the relationship between product quality and governance mode choice
(market mode, hybrid mode or vertical integration) using the results of a survey of 187 …

Contracting in the wine supply chain with bilateral moral hazard, residual claimancy and multi-tasking

B Steiner - European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2012 - academic.oup.com
This paper takes a quasi-case-study approach to stylised wine industry facts to assess
predictions about the optimal sharing rule from a principal–agent model with residual …