Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape.
In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are …

The heterogeneous abilities of players in various competitive contexts often lead to
undesirable outcomes such as low effort provision, a lack of diversity, and inequality. A …

This paper explores the optimal design of biased contests. A designer imposes an identity‐
dependent treatment on contestants that varies the balance of the playing field. A …

Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing have been extensively studied under the
framework of all-pay auctions. Along a distinct line, this paper proposes to use Tullock …

We analyze the revenue-enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete-
information all-pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants …

The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive answer to some fundamental
questions related to discrimination within the context of contests. For example, what forms of …

It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for
parameter values r≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue …

This paper considers all-pay contests in which the relationship between bids and allocations
reflects a small amount of noise. Prior work had focused on one particular equilibrium …

We consider a two-stage contest, in which only a subset of contestants enters the finale. We
explore the optimal policy for disclosing contestants' interim status after the preliminary …

Player-versus-player (PvP) games often allow users to purchase superior virtual gears to
increase their winning odds in battles against others. This game design, known as “pay to …