[PDF][PDF] Contests: Theory and topics

Q Fu, Z Wu - Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and …, 2019 - researchgate.net
Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape.
In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are …

Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests

SM Chowdhury, P Esteve‐González… - Southern Economic …, 2023 - Wiley Online Library
The heterogeneous abilities of players in various competitive contexts often lead to
undesirable outcomes such as low effort provision, a lack of diversity, and inequality. A …

On the optimal design of biased contests

Q Fu, Z Wu - Theoretical Economics, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
This paper explores the optimal design of biased contests. A designer imposes an identity‐
dependent treatment on contestants that varies the balance of the playing field. A …

Crowdsourcing with tullock contests: A new perspective

T Luo, SS Kanhere, HP Tan, F Wu… - 2015 IEEE Conference …, 2015 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing have been extensively studied under the
framework of all-pay auctions. Along a distinct line, this paper proposes to use Tullock …

Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests

J Franke, W Leininger, C Wasser - European Economic Review, 2018 - Elsevier
We analyze the revenue-enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete-
information all-pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants …

Discrimination in contests: a survey

Y Mealem, S Nitzan - Review of Economic Design, 2016 - Springer
The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive answer to some fundamental
questions related to discrimination within the context of contests. For example, what forms of …

[HTML][HTML] Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players

C Ewerhart - Economics Letters, 2017 - Elsevier
It is shown that the equilibrium in the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest is unique for
parameter values r≤ 2. This allows proving a revenue ranking result saying that a revenue …

[HTML][HTML] Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction

C Ewerhart - Games and Economic Behavior, 2017 - Elsevier
This paper considers all-pay contests in which the relationship between bids and allocations
reflects a small amount of noise. Prior work had focused on one particular equilibrium …

Disclosure and favoritism in sequential elimination contests

Q Fu, Z Wu - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022 - aeaweb.org
We consider a two-stage contest, in which only a subset of contestants enters the finale. We
explore the optimal policy for disclosing contestants' interim status after the preliminary …

Player-vs.-Player Game Design and Pricing: A Tournament Design Perspective

H Deng, Y Dou, Z Wu, C Zhang - Information Systems …, 2024 - pubsonline.informs.org
Player-versus-player (PvP) games often allow users to purchase superior virtual gears to
increase their winning odds in battles against others. This game design, known as “pay to …