We investigate the strategic incentives for partial vertical integration, namely, partial
ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when retailers privately know …

This paper analyzes the choice to interlock as a strategic decision. The choice to invite an
executive from a rival company to sit on the board is analyzed within a duopoly where firms …

We characterize the degree of price discretion that two competing manufacturers grant their
retailers in a framework where demand is uncertain and privately observed by the retailers …

This study investigates the effects of transparency in a sequential moral hazard problem,
where a leader and a follower consecutively take an action. The principal chooses whether …

We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately
informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at …

We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection. Principals pay
informational rents due to asymmetric information and sell their output in a homogeneous …

We study internal incentives, transparency and firm performance in multidivisional
organizations. Two independent divisions of the same firm design internal incentives, and …

A manufacturer relies on an exclusive subcontractor for production and competes
horizontally against an integrated rival that produces in‐house. The exclusive agent is …

We characterize the degree of price discretion that competing principals award their agents
in a framework where agents are informed about demand and seek to pass on their …

This study analyzes the choice to interlock between two competing companies when their
privately known marginal costs are correlated. The two rivals are organized into different …