The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such
that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social …

There is a veritable menagerie of auctions—single-dimensional, multi-dimensional, single-
sided, double-sided, first-price, second-price, English, Dutch, Japanese, sealed-bid—and …

Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in delicate
experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design …

Some of the basic results and insights of the literature on mechanism design are presented.
In that literature game theoretic reasoning is used to model social institutions as varied as …

A fundamental problem in building open distributed systems is to design mechanisms that
compute optimal system-wide solutions despite the self-interest of individual users and …

There are two parts to this paper. Part One introduces the subject of implementation, and
provides applications (in particular, to the theory of contracts). This part is written so as to be …

When incentives work well, individuals prosper. When incentives are poor, the pursuit of self-
interest is self-defeating. This book is wholly devoted to the topical subject of incentives from …

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We consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents
who may have private information about their preferences. In such a setting, standard …

In this paper I prove that in the standard model of 2× n (n≧ 2) pure exchange economies
there is no allocation mechanism that is efficient, non-inversely-dictatorial, and strategy …