Games as tools to address conservation conflicts

SM Redpath, A Keane, H Andrén… - Trends in ecology & …, 2018 - cell.com
Conservation conflicts represent complex multilayered problems that are challenging to
study. We explore the utility of theoretical, experimental, and constructivist approaches to …

Collective risk-taking in the commons

O Bochet, J Laurent-Lucchetti, J Leroux… - Journal of Economic …, 2019 - Elsevier
The management of natural commons is typically subject to threshold effects. If individuals
are risk-averse, some of the recent economic literature holds that uncertainty on the …

[PDF][PDF] Collective Risk-Taking with Threshold Effects

O Bochet, J Laurent-Lucchetti, J Leroux… - 2015 - access.archive-ouverte.unige.ch
It is commonly found that the presence of uncertainty helps discipline economic agents in
strategic contexts where incentives would otherwise induce inefficient behavior (Eso and …

[引用][C] Collective Dangerous Behavior: Theory and Evidence on Risk-Taking

O Bochet, J Laurent-Lucchetti, J Leroux… - 2013 - Département d'Econométrie …

[引用][C] Collective Risk-Taking with Threshold Effects

J Lucchetti, O Bochet, J Leroux, B Sinclair-Desgagne - 2015