Transaction fee mechanism design
T Roughgarden - Journal of the ACM, 2024 - dl.acm.org
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply,
necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include “on-chain” from …
necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include “on-chain” from …
Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules
MV Xavier Ferreira, DC Parkes - Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM …, 2023 - dl.acm.org
Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for
permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of US dollars. In the …
permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of US dollars. In the …
Transaction fee mechanism design with active block producers
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been
investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …
investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …
Riggs: Decentralized sealed-bid auctions
We introduce the first practical protocols for fully decentralized sealed-bid auctions using
timed commitments. Timed commitments ensure that the auction is finalized fairly even if all …
timed commitments. Timed commitments ensure that the auction is finalized fairly even if all …
Transaction fee mechanism design in a post-mev world
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been
investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …
investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …
Multi-block MEV
Multi-block MEV (MMEV) denotes the practice of securing k-consecutive blocks in an attempt
at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the …
at extracting surplus value by manipulating transaction ordering. Following the …
A theory of auditability for allocation and social choice mechanisms
A Grigoryan, M Möller - arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.09314, 2023 - arxiv.org
In centralized mechanisms and platforms, participants do not fully observe each others' type
reports. Hence, the central authority (the designer) may deviate from the promised …
reports. Hence, the central authority (the designer) may deviate from the promised …
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
A Ganesh, C Thomas, SM Weinberg - arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.07566, 2024 - arxiv.org
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction
inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is …
inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is …
Towards optimal prior-free permissionless rebate mechanisms, with applications to automated market makers & combinatorial orderflow auctions
B Mazorra, N Della Penna - arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.17024, 2023 - arxiv.org
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a critical issue for blockchain ecosystems, as
it enables validators or block proposers to extract value by ordering, including or censoring …
it enables validators or block proposers to extract value by ordering, including or censoring …
Shill-proof auctions
In a single-item auction, a duplicitous seller may masquerade as one or more bidders in
order to manipulate the clearing price. This paper characterizes auction formats that are shill …
order to manipulate the clearing price. This paper characterizes auction formats that are shill …