Electoral accountability: Recent theoretical and empirical work
S Ashworth - Annual Review of Political Science, 2012 - annualreviews.org
Competitive elections create a relationship of formal accountability between policy makers
and citizens. Recent theoretical work suggests that there are limits on how well this formal …
and citizens. Recent theoretical work suggests that there are limits on how well this formal …
Learning about voter rationality
S Ashworth, E Bueno de Mesquita… - American Journal of …, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
An important empirical literature evaluates whether voters are rational by examining how
electoral outcomes respond to events outside the control of politicians, such as natural …
electoral outcomes respond to events outside the control of politicians, such as natural …
Is voter competence good for voters?: Information, rationality, and democratic performance
S Ashworth, EB De Mesquita - American Political Science Review, 2014 - cambridge.org
A long research tradition in behavioral political science evaluates the performance of
democracy by examining voter competence. This literature got its start arguing that voters' …
democracy by examining voter competence. This literature got its start arguing that voters' …
[图书][B] Formal models of domestic politics
S Gehlbach - 2021 - books.google.com
Formal Models of Domestic Politics offers a unified and accessible approach to canonical
and important new models of politics. Intended for political science and economics students …
and important new models of politics. Intended for political science and economics students …
Accountability and information in elections
S Ashworth, EB De Mesquita… - American Economic …, 2017 - aeaweb.org
Elections are thought to improve voter welfare through two channels: effective accountability
(ie, providing incentives for politicians to take costly effort) and electoral selection (ie …
(ie, providing incentives for politicians to take costly effort) and electoral selection (ie …
Making elections work: Accountability with selection and control
V Anesi, P Buisseret - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2022 - aeaweb.org
We study the limits of dynamic electoral accountability when voters are uncertain about
politicians' characteristics (adverse selection) and their actions (moral hazard). Existing work …
politicians' characteristics (adverse selection) and their actions (moral hazard). Existing work …
[图书][B] Political Competition and the Study of Public Economics
Why is an understanding of political competition essential for the study of public economics
and public policy generally? How can political competition be described and understood …
and public policy generally? How can political competition be described and understood …
Local agency costs of political centralization
RB Myerson - Theoretical Economics, 2021 - Wiley Online Library
We analyze a model of moral hazard in local public services, which could be efficiently
managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are …
managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are …
Popular referendum and electoral accountability
P Le Bihan - Political Science Research and Methods, 2018 - cambridge.org
This paper studies how citizen-initiated referenda affect the decision-making of elected
representatives. In the absence of direct democracy, elected officials who do not share the …
representatives. In the absence of direct democracy, elected officials who do not share the …
Electoral institutions and the national provision of local public goods
S Gehlbach - Available at SSRN 746125, 2006 - papers.ssrn.com
I explore the incentives under alternative electoral institutions for national politicians to
efficiently provide local public goods. Using a career-concerns models which incorporates …
efficiently provide local public goods. Using a career-concerns models which incorporates …