This review identifies empirical facts about lobbying that are generally agreed upon in the
literature. It then discusses challenges to empirical research in lobbying and provides …

What explains private investment in autocracies, where institutions that discourage
expropriation in democracies are absent? We argue that institutionalized ruling parties allow …

Businesspeople run for and win elected office around the world, with roughly one-third of
members of parliament and numerous heads of states coming directly from the private …

This article analyses the emergence of United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) as a dominant
party by examining the behaviour of Russia's governors. Using original data on when …

Arrangements by which politically connected firms receive economic favors are a common
feature around the world, but little is known of the form or effects of influence in business …

This article introduces the Continent of International Law (COIL) research project on
international agreement design. COIL stems from the conviction that the International …

To explain trade policies, a large literature draws on domestic institutions. Institutions that
are more responsive to narrow-interest groups are expected to succumb to protectionist …

Political competition and “merchant group” pressures have been pointed to as forces that
limit state threats to the property rights of firms. This article presents evidence confirming …

First,[Russian citizens] rightly did not believe that all “the other” taxpayers where paying their
taxes properly, so it was really no point in being “the only one” who acted honestly. The …

Autocrats confront a number of threats to their power, some from within the regime and
others from foreign actors. To understand how these threats interact and affect autocratic …