Unemployment Risk and Debt Contract Design

N Yehuda, CS Armstrong, D Cohen… - The Accounting …, 2023 - publications.aaahq.org
We examine how firms' contractual relationships with their employees affect the design of
their debt contracts, and the use of financial covenants in particular. Viewing the firm as the …

Unemployment insurance as a worker indiscipline device? Evidence from scanner data

L Lusher, GC Schnorr, RLC Taylor - American Economic Journal …, 2022 - aeaweb.org
We provide causal evidence of an ex ante moral hazard effect of unemployment insurance
(UI) by matching plausibly exogenous changes in UI benefit duration across state-weeks …

[图书][B] Taxes and Unemployment: Collective Bargaining and Efficiency Wage Models

L Goerke - 2012 - books.google.com
This chapter has set out in detail the models which are employed below in order to analyse
the labour market effects of changes in tax rates and in alterations in the tax structure. The …

[图书][B] Steuerpolitik und Arbeitslosigkeit

C Fuest - 2000 - books.google.com
English summary: Clemens Fuest discusses the employment and welfare effects of tax
reforms in economies with equilibrium unemployment. He analyses the employment effects …

A note on efficiency wage theory and principal–agent theory

U Jirjahn - Bulletin of Economic Research, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
Why are principal–agent models used in some circumstances and efficiency wage models in
others? In this note, it is argued that efficiency wages provide incentives based on an …

The wedge

L Goerke - The Manchester School, 2000 - Wiley Online Library
It is often argued that the quantity that is traded on the market is independent of the side of
the market which is taxed. However, this assertion need not hold, especially in imperfectly …

Indirect benefits of infrastructure improvement in the case of an imperfect labor market

X Zhu, J Van Ommeren, P Rietveld - Transportation Research Part B …, 2009 - Elsevier
We perform a welfare analysis of transport infrastructure improvements in the presence of an
imperfect labor market, allowing for endogenous wages and involuntary unemployment …

Experience rating versus employment protection laws in a model where firms monitor workers

J Fath, C Fuest - Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2005 - Wiley Online Library
While layoff costs in the US are mostly due to experience‐rated unemployment insurance,
layoff costs in European labour markets are primarily a consequence of employment …

Worker productivity, working time reduction, and the short–run and long–run employment effects

C Huang, J Chang, C Lai, C Lin - Scottish Journal of Political …, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
This paper illustrates a shirking–type efficiency wage model to explain why shorter working
hours cause an ambiguous effect on employment as the empirical result. We find that shorter …

Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard

D Demougin, C Helm - European Economic Review, 2011 - Elsevier
We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-
constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non …