The mechanism design approach to student assignment involves the theoretical, empirical,
and experimental study of systems used to allocate students into schools around the world …

Preferences for schools are important determinants of equitable access to high-quality
education, effects of expanded choice on school improvement, and school choice …

This paper develops a price-theoretic framework for matching markets with heterogeneous
preferences. The model departs from the Gale and Shapley model by assuming that a finite …

A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate
school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. Many of …

The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among
efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze …

We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching
mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is …

This article discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of
designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide …

Executive summary This report presents an analysis of the social, technical and regulatory
challenges associated with algorithmic transparency and accountability, including a review …

Despite its widespread use, the Boston mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive
and welfare performances compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm …

We use theory and field data to study the draft mechanism used to allocate courses at
Harvard Business School. We show that the draft is manipulable in theory, manipulated in …