Many school districts with centralized school choice adopt strategy-proof assignment
mechanisms to relieve applicants from needing to strategize based on beliefs about their …

In 1979, Weitzman introduced Pandora's box problem as a framework for sequential search
with costly inspections. Recently, there has been a surge of interest in Pandora's box …

We study two-sided matching markets in which one side of the market (the players) does not
have a priori knowledge about its preferences for the other side (the arms) and is required to …

ABSTRACT A menu description presents a mechanism to player i in two steps. Step (1) uses
the reports of other players to describe i's menu: the set of i's potential outcomes. Step (2) …

The rational choice framework for modeling matching markets has been tremendously
useful in guiding the design of school-assignment systems. Despite this success, a large …

When participating in school choice, students often spend substantial effort acquiring
information about schools. We investigate how two popular mechanisms incentivize …

Matching markets are often organized in a multi-stage and decentralized manner. Moreover,
participants in real-world matching markets often have uncertain preferences. This article …

Algorithmic monoculture arises when many decision-makers rely on the same algorithm to
evaluate applicants. An emerging body of work investigates possible harms of this kind of …

When applying to a university, students and their parents devote considerable time
acquiring information about university programs in order to form preferences. We explore …

We study the design of a decentralized two-sided matching market in which agents' search
is guided by the platform. Each agent is of one of finitely many types and has (potentially …