The bilevel program is a sequence of two optimization problems where the constraint region
of the upper level problem is determined implicitly by the solution set to the lower level …

We analyze a tractable class of multitask principal–agent problems, such as the one faced
by a firm with a manager overseeing several projects. We allow for tasks to be complements …

This paper studies a class of one-dimensional screening problems where the agent's utility
function does not satisfy the Spence–Mirrlees condition (SMC). The strength of the SMC for …

This paper presents a new method for the analysis of moral hazard principal–agent
problems. The new approach avoids the stringent assumptions on the distribution of …

The two major paradigms in the theoretical agency literature are moral hazard (ie, hidden
action) and adverse selection (ie, hidden information). Prior research typically solves these …

Principal–agent models are pervasive in theoretical and applied economics, but their
analysis has largely been limited to the “first‐order approach”(FOA), where incentive …

Although stock options are commonly observed in chief executive officer (CEO)
compensation contracts, there is theoretical controversy about whether stock options are …

Holmström (1979) provides a condition for a signal to have positive value assuming the
validity of the first-order approach. This paper extends Holmström's analysis to settings …

I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the
stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse …

We develop a simple sufficient condition for an optimal contract of a moral hazard problem to
be monotone in the output signal. Existing results on monotonicity require conditions on the …