We show that a two-sided matching platform can successfully compete by limiting the
number of choices it offers to its customers, while charging higher prices than platforms with …

We study two-sided markets with a finite number of agents on each side, and with two-sided
incomplete information. Agents are matched assortatively on the basis of costly signals …

We study centralized many‐to‐many matching in markets where agents have private
information about (vertical) characteristics that determine match values. Our analysis reveals …

I study the ex-ante efficient allocation of a set of quality-heterogeneous objects to a number
of heterogeneous risk-neutral agents. Agents have independent private values, which …

We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse
selection (see Stiglitz 1977) where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly …

I study a monopolist who sells a signal to a consumer with a hidden type. The consumer
uses this signal to obtain social status, defined as the expectation of the consumer's type …

We consider two alternatives to optimal auctions: posted-price mechanisms and dynamic
auctions. In posted-price mechanisms, the seller posts a single price and sells the item at …

Some of the best-known results in mechanism design depend critically on Myerson's (Math
Oper Res 6: 58–73, 1981) regularity condition. For example, the second-price auction with …

College admissions in many countries are based on a centrally administered test. Applicants
invest a great deal of resources to improve their performance on the test, and there is …

Over the last few decades the animal communication community has become increasingly
aware that much communication occurs using multiple signals in multiple modalities. The …