We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …

Maximizing the revenue from selling more than one good (or item) to a single buyer is a
notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show …

We initiate the study of computing (near-) optimal contracts in succinctly representable
principal-agent settings. Here optimality means maximizing the principal's expected payoff …

We provide a justification for the prevalence of linear (commission-based) contracts in
practice under the Bayesian framework. We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model …

We consider the menu size of auctions and mechanisms in general as a measure of their
complexity, and study how it affects revenue. Our setting has a single revenue-maximizing …

We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple bidders in
unrestricted multi-dimensional settings. Specifically, we study the standard model of additive …

We study the sample complexity of learning revenue-optimal multi-item auctions. We obtain
the first set of positive results that go beyond the standard but unrealistic setting of item …

ABSTRACT A menu description presents a mechanism to player i in two steps. Step (1) uses
the reports of other players to describe i's menu: the set of i's potential outcomes. Step (2) …

Modern ad auctions allow advertisers to target more specific segments of the user
population. Unfortunately, this is not always in the best interest of the ad platform–partially …

We study a robust selling problem where a seller attempts to sell one item to a buyer but is
uncertain about the buyer's valuation distribution. The existing literature shows that robust …