We introduce new power indices to measure the a priori voting power of voters in liquid
democracy elections where an underlying network restricts delegations. We argue that our …

We introduce new power indices to measure the a priori voting power of voters in liquid
democracy elections where an underlying network restricts delegations. We argue that our …

We investigate a class of weighted voting games for which weights are randomly distributed
over the standard probability simplex. We provide close-formed formulae for the expectation …

Weighted voting games model decision-making bodies where decisions are made by a
majority vote. In such games, each agent has a weight, and a coalition of agents wins the …

This paper constructs a non-cooperative/cooperative stochastic differential game model to
prove that the optimal strategies trajectory of agents in a system with a topological …

We study the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The Shapley value has been used
as an index for measuring the power of individual agents in decision-making bodies and …