This article surveys the literature on principal-agent problems with moral hazard that gained
popularity following the seminal works of Mirrlees (1976), Holmström (1979), and others …

This paper considers a moral hazard problem where the agent can choose any output
distribution with a support in a given compact set. The agent's effort‐cost is smooth and …

Using misstatement data, we find that the distribution of detected fraud features a heavy tail.
We propose a theoretical mechanism that explains such a relatively high frequency of …

This paper considers a moral hazard model with agent limited liability. Prior to interacting
with the principal, the agent designs the production technology, which is a specification of …

Executive compensation contracts use information from markets and accounting to elicit
efficient incentives. We structurally estimate the contribution of each performance to quantify …

How to incentivize a manager to create value and be socially responsible? A manager can
predict how his decisions will affect measures of social performance, and will therefore …

In a model where the agent has a very rich action space, we show that optimal contracting
can be decomposed into three stages: constructing unbiased estimates of revenues and …