The power of simple menus in robust selling mechanisms
S Wang - Management Science, 2024 - pubsonline.informs.org
We study a robust selling problem where a seller attempts to sell one item to a buyer but is
uncertain about the buyer's valuation distribution. The existing literature shows that robust …
uncertain about the buyer's valuation distribution. The existing literature shows that robust …
Multi-dimensional screening: buyer-optimal learning and informational robustness
R Deb, AK Roesler - Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
What is the optimal mechanism that a monopolist should use to sell multiple goods to a
single buyer? Despite being a classic economic problem, multi-dimensional screening is …
single buyer? Despite being a classic economic problem, multi-dimensional screening is …
Lemonade from lemons: Information design and adverse selection
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be
interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures …
interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures …
On the robustness of second-price auctions in prior-independent mechanism design
Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but the
common prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent …
common prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent …
Distributional robustness: From pricing to auctions
N Bachrach, I Talgam-Cohen - arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.09008, 2022 - arxiv.org
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which
yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply …
yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply …
On the structure of informationally robust optimal mechanisms
We study the design of optimal mechanisms when the designer is uncertain both about the
form of information held by the agents and also about which equilibrium will be played. The …
form of information held by the agents and also about which equilibrium will be played. The …
Multidimensional Screening with Rich Consumer Data
A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for
the goods. As is well-known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple …
the goods. As is well-known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple …
Separation in distributionally robust monopolist problem
We consider a monopoly pricing problem, where a seller has multiple items to sell to a
single buyer, only knowing the distribution of the buyer's value profile. The seller's goal is to …
single buyer, only knowing the distribution of the buyer's value profile. The seller's goal is to …
Robust Robustness
I Ball, D Kattwinkel - arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.16898, 2024 - arxiv.org
The maxmin approach to distributional robustness evaluates each mechanism according to
its payoff guarantee over all priors in an ambiguity set. We propose a refinement: the …
its payoff guarantee over all priors in an ambiguity set. We propose a refinement: the …
Semi-Separable Mechanisms in Multi-Item Robust Screening
S Wang - arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.13580, 2024 - arxiv.org
It is generally challenging to characterize the optimal selling mechanism even when the
seller knows the buyer's valuation distributions in multi-item screening. An insightful and …
seller knows the buyer's valuation distributions in multi-item screening. An insightful and …