Monotone function intervals: Theory and applications

KH Yang, AK Zentefis - American Economic Review, 2024 - aeaweb.org
A monotone function interval is the set of monotone functions that lie pointwise between two
fixed,-monotone functions. We characterize the set of extreme points of monotone function …

Private private information

K He, F Sandomirskiy, O Tamuz - arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.14356, 2021 - arxiv.org
A private private information structure delivers information about an unknown state while
preserving privacy: An agent's signal contains information about the state but remains …

[PDF][PDF] The public option and optimal redistribution

ZY Kang - 2023 - fass.nus.edu.sg
This paper examines how the equilibrium effects of a public option on the private market
impact its optimal design. I develop a model in which a policymaker can choose the quality …

Beckmann's approach to multi-item multi-bidder auctions

AV Kolesnikov, F Sandomirskiy, A Tsyvinski… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2022 - arxiv.org
We consider the problem of revenue-maximizing Bayesian auction design with several
bidders having independent private values over several items. We show that it can be …

[PDF][PDF] The Economics of Monotone Function Intervals

KH Yang, AK Zentefis - 2023 - som.yale.edu
Monotone function intervals are sets of monotone functions that are bounded pointwise
above and below by two monotone functions. We characterize the extreme points of such …

Extreme Points in Multi-Dimensional Screening

P Lahr, A Niemeyer - arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.00649, 2024 - arxiv.org
This paper characterizes extreme points of the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms for
screening problems with linear utility. Extreme points are exhaustive mechanisms, meaning …

Diversity in Choice as Majorization

F Echenique, T Mekonnen, MB Yenmez - arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.17589, 2024 - arxiv.org
We use majorization to model comparative diversity in school choice. A population of agents
is more diverse than another population of agents if its distribution over groups is less …

Falsifiable Test Design in Coordination Games

Y Li, B Xu - arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.18521, 2024 - arxiv.org
A principal can propose a project to an agent, who then decides whether to accept. Their
payoffs from launching the project depend on an unknown binary state. The principal can …

[PDF][PDF] Targeting subsidies through price menus: Menu design and evidence from clean fuels

S Abubakari, KP Asante, M Daouda, BK Jack, D Jack… - 2024 - ibread.org
Targeting subsidies to maximize social objectives often requires screening potential
recipients on unobservable characteristics. We consider the case where a policy maker …

Multi-Criteria Allocation Mechanisms: Constraints and Comparative Statics

A Nikzad - Available at SSRN, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
We study the structure of Pareto optimal mechanisms in settings where the planner
considers more than one objective criterion. Specifically, we (i) characterize mechanisms …