We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a
new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem …

Preferences for schools are important determinants of equitable access to high-quality
education, effects of expanded choice on school improvement, and school choice …

Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …

Understanding how returns to higher education vary across degree programs is critical for
effective higher education policy. Yet there is little evidence as to whether all degrees …

COVID-19 has revealed limitations of existing mechanisms for rationing medical resources
under emergency scenarios. Many argue that these mechanisms abandon various ethical …

This paper examines the impact of perceived risk of street harassment on women's human
capital attainment. I assemble a unique dataset that combines information on 4,000 students …

Several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to
misrepresent their preferences. We find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in …

A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate
school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. Many of …

We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching
mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is …

We propose a criterion of approximate incentive compatibility, strategy-proofness in the
large (SP-L), and argue that it is a useful second-best to exact strategy-proofness (SP) for …