Theories and behavioural drivers underlying fleet dynamics models

IE Van Putten, S Kulmala, O Thébaud… - Fish and …, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
In the domain of decision‐support tools for the management of marine fish resources,
considerable attention has been paid to the development of models explaining how fish …

[HTML][HTML] Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental and water resource issues

I Parrachino - 2006 - books.google.com
Game theory provides useful insights into the way parties that share a scarce resource may
plan their utilization of the resource under different situations. This review provides a brief …

Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements

C Carraro, J Eyckmans, M Finus - The Review of International …, 2006 - Springer
The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers
play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements. However, the …

Cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater

K Madani, A Dinar - Water Resources Research, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
Beneficiaries of common pool resources (CPRs) may select available noncooperative and
regulatory exogenous institutions for managing the resource, as well as cooperative …

[图书][B] Cooperative Game Theory and Its Application to Natural Environmental and Water Resource Issues: 2. Application to Natural and Environmental Resources

S Zara, F Patrone, A Dinar - 2006 - books.google.com
This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to
issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition …

Sharing rules and stability in coalition games with externalities

LG Kronbak, M Lindroos - Marine Resource Economics, 2007 - journals.uchicago.edu
This paper examines cooperative sharing rules in fisheries coalition games and develops a
new sharing rule that takes into account the stability of cooperation when externalities are …

[HTML][HTML] Dilemma of total allowable catch (TACs) allocated as shareable quotas: Applying a bio-economic game-theoretical approach to euro-mauritanian fisheries …

E Abou Kane, P Brehmer - Aquaculture and Fisheries, 2024 - Elsevier
The recent fisheries management approach by Mauritania recommends that Total Allowable
Catch (TAC) quotas, identified as essential for maintaining fish stocks, be shared (allocated) …

Coalition games in fisheries economics

M Lindroos, V Kaitala… - Advances in Fisheries …, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
The focus of this chapter is the analysis of coalitions, a topic that has received increasing
attention in fisheries economics in the last ten years (Kaitala and Lindroos, 1998; Arnason et …

International fisheries agreements: A game theoretical approach

P Pintassilgo, LG Kronbak, M Lindroos - Environmental and Resource …, 2015 - Springer
This paper surveys the application of game theory to the economic analysis of international
fisheries agreements. The relevance of this study comes not only from the existence of a vast …

Game theoretic applications to fisheries

V Kaitala, M Lindroos - Handbook of operations research in natural …, 2007 - Springer
This chapter reviews non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretic models applied to the
economics and management of multi-agent fisheries. We first compare two-player static and …