Philosophical perplexity about intention begins with its appearance in three guises: intention
for the future, as I intend to complete this entry by the end of the month; the intention with …

Written against the background of her controversial opposition to the University of Oxford's
awarding of an honorary degree to Harry S. Truman, Elizabeth Anscombe's Intention laid the …

Belief does aim at the truth. When our beliefs do not fit the facts, they cannot do what they
are supposed to do, because they cannot provide us with reasons. We cannot plausibly …

Reflection on talk of reasons for action or belief suggests that reasons serve both normative
and explanatory purposes. We cite reasons both when we answer questions as to why we …

This book offers an accessible and inclusive overview of the major debates in the
philosophy of action. It covers the distinct approaches taken by Donald Davidson, GEM …

Many philosophers hold that we exercise some form of epistemic agency: that we can be
active, rather than passive, in relation to our beliefs. This con viction is expressed in various …

It is a truism that we ought to be rational. Despite this (or because of it), it has become
popular to think that it is not the case that we ought to be rational. In this paper I argue for a …

Sometimes, there are reasons for which we believe, intend, resent, decide, and so on: these
reasons are the “bases” of the latter, and the explanatory relation between these bases and …

Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to
fit” the world and desires (or intentions) are such that they “aim at realization” or the world …

What kind of activity are non-human animals capable of? A venerable tradition insists that
lack of language confines them to 'mere behaviour'. This article engages with this …