Financial constraints preclude many surplus producing economic transactions, and inhibit
the growth of many others. This paper models financial constraints as the interaction of two …

A regulator faces a stream of agents engaged in crimes with stochastic returns. The
regulator designs an amnesty program, committing to a time path of punishments for …

In this paper, I study the dynamic delegation problem in a principal–agent model wherein an
agent privately observes a persistently evolving state, and the principal commits to actions …

This paper builds a theory of dynamic pricing for the sale of timed goods. The main friction is
private and evolving valuation of the buyer prior to the date of consumption, which follows a …

This paper analyzes the effect of price leadership on collusion among firms with different
discount factors. We first find that price leadership relaxes the incentive constraints for …

Mid-and low-level managers play a significant role within the organizational hierarchy, far
beyond monitoring. It is often their responsibility to respond to opportunities and threats …

I analyze long-term contracting in insurance markets with asymmetric information. The buyer
privately observes her risk type, which evolves stochastically over time. A long-term contract …

Lectures on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design Page 1 Lectures on Dynamic
Contracts and Mechanism Design to be delivered at the Department of Economics and …

An underlying assumption in many principal agent models and its applications is that the
agent has some private information and principal has the bargaining power of setting …

An agent performs randomly arriving tasks that are rare and “difficult,” and a principal may
provide frequent but low-value compensation. We characterize the optimal contract for both …