Market conduct, interconnection costs and benchmarking in mobile phone industry: the Tunisian case
S Debbichi, A Ben Khalifa - International Journal of Mobile …, 2013 - inderscienceonline.com
In this work, we estimate the market power and interconnection costs with the Lerner index
on the interconnection market. Our work will focus on the hypothesis 'Balanced Calling …
on the interconnection market. Our work will focus on the hypothesis 'Balanced Calling …
Interconnexion de réseaux et charge d'accès: une analyse stratégique
L Flochel - Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 1999 - JSTOR
Cet article étudie le choix de la charge d'accès à une infrastructure essentielle dans un
processus totalement décentralisé. Une entreprise intégrée verticalement est en monopole …
processus totalement décentralisé. Une entreprise intégrée verticalement est en monopole …
Network externalities and interconnection: the case of information intrastructures
I Crocq - Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Information infrastructures are characterized by the existence of direct and indirect network
externalities. However, the presence of externalities poses two types of problem: they create …
externalities. However, the presence of externalities poses two types of problem: they create …
Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia: What Lessons from International Experiences
S Debbichi, W Hichri - Available at SSRN 2405776, 2014 - papers.ssrn.com
We try in this paper to characterize the state of mobile phone market in Tunisia. Our study is
based on a survey of foreign experience (Europe) in detecting collusive behavior and a …
based on a survey of foreign experience (Europe) in detecting collusive behavior and a …
[PDF][PDF] GROUPE D'ANALYSE ET DE THÉORIE ÉCONOMIQUE LYON-‐ST ÉTIENNE
M Case - 2013 - Citeseer
We present a Cournot model that compares the critical threshold of collusion in Duopoly and
Oligopoly Markets where the actors are private, mixed or public. We assume that the …
Oligopoly Markets where the actors are private, mixed or public. We assume that the …
Threshold of preference for collusion and interconnection fees in different market structures: the Tunisian mobile market case
S Debbichi, W Hichri - International Journal of …, 2018 - inderscienceonline.com
With imperfect competition in the mobile phone market, the regulator cannot easily control
the behaviour of the operators. In this paper, we develop an indicator" critical threshold …
the behaviour of the operators. In this paper, we develop an indicator" critical threshold …
[引用][C] Externalités de réseaux, adoptions technologiques et relations verticales: une revue de la littérature
E Baranes - Revue d'économie politique, 1998 - dialnet.unirioja.es
[引用][C] Indépendance du Régulateur et performance de la Téléphonie mobile dans les Pays Arabes: Application Econométrique
D Sami, BK Ahmed