Abstract Theory of mind research has traditionally focused on the ascription of mental states
to a single individual. Here, we introduce a theory of collective mind: the ascription of a …

Framing effects are everywhere. An estate tax looks very different to a death tax. Gun safety
seems to be one thing and gun control another. Yet, the consensus from decision theorists …

'Public moods' are often referred to in laymen's accounts of public reactions to social events,
yet the concept has rarely been invoked by social scientists. Taking public moods seriously …

In this paper I outline the PAIR account of joint attention as a perceptual-practical, affectively
charged intentional relation. I argue that to explain joint attention we need to leave the …

What enables everyday collective attitudes such as the intention of two persons to go for a
walk together? Most current approaches are concerned with full-fledged collective attitudes …

This paper argues that to account for group speech acts, we should adopt a
representationalist account of mode/force. Individual and collective subjects do not only …

Raimo Tuomela's most important contribution to the philosophy of collective intentionality
was his development of the notion of the we-mode. In my chapter I extend the notion of we …

We seem to ascribe mental states and agency to groups. We say 'Google knows such-and-
such,'or 'Amazon intends to do such-and-such.'This observation of ordinary parlance also …

" Dimensions of Shared Agency" investigates the way in which standard philosophical
accounts have been dealing with the issue of collective actions. In particular, the book …

My goal in this paper is to support the view that a certain way of being and acting together
with others, we-part engagement in paradigmatically social practices, is among the basic …