A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set where both
strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst …

We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific
information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic agents …

Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists) Page 230 9780521872829main
CUNY1061-Nisan 0 521 87282 0 July 5, 2007 14: 17 CHAPTER 9 Introduction to Mechanism …

The Encyclopedia of Algorithms will provide a comprehensive set of solutions to important
algorithmic problems for students and researchers interested in quickly locating useful …

We study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full
incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings, allowing for probabilistic …

In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design,\citet {NR99}
studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on …

We propose a nonlinear difference-in-differences (DiD) method to estimate multivariate
counterfactual distributions in classical treatment and control study designs with …

We consider a market-based resource allocation model for batch jobs in cloud computing
clusters. In our model, we incorporate the importance of the due date of a job rather than the …

We consider the problem of makespan minimization on m unrelated machines in the context
of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a …

We introduce a novel pricing and resource allocation approach for batch jobs on cloud
systems. In our economic model, users submit jobs with a value function that specifies …