Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms
S Li - American Economic Review, 2017 - aeaweb.org
A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set where both
strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst …
strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no better than the worst …
Mechanism design via differential privacy
F McSherry, K Talwar - 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on …, 2007 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific
information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic agents …
information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic agents …
[PDF][PDF] Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists)
N Nisan - Algorithmic game theory, 2007 - cs.cmu.edu
Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists) Page 230 9780521872829main
CUNY1061-Nisan 0 521 87282 0 July 5, 2007 14: 17 CHAPTER 9 Introduction to Mechanism …
CUNY1061-Nisan 0 521 87282 0 July 5, 2007 14: 17 CHAPTER 9 Introduction to Mechanism …
[图书][B] Encyclopedia of algorithms
MY Kao - 2008 - books.google.com
The Encyclopedia of Algorithms will provide a comprehensive set of solutions to important
algorithmic problems for students and researchers interested in quickly locating useful …
algorithmic problems for students and researchers interested in quickly locating useful …
When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
G Carroll - Econometrica, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
We study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full
incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings, allowing for probabilistic …
incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings, allowing for probabilistic …
Strategyproof scheduling with predictions
In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design,\citet {NR99}
studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on …
studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on …
An optimal transport approach to estimating causal effects via nonlinear difference-in-differences
We propose a nonlinear difference-in-differences (DiD) method to estimate multivariate
counterfactual distributions in classical treatment and control study designs with …
counterfactual distributions in classical treatment and control study designs with …
Near-optimal scheduling mechanisms for deadline-sensitive jobs in large computing clusters
We consider a market-based resource allocation model for batch jobs in cloud computing
clusters. In our model, we incorporate the importance of the due date of a job rather than the …
clusters. In our model, we incorporate the importance of the due date of a job rather than the …
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
R Lavi, C Swamy - Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic …, 2007 - dl.acm.org
We consider the problem of makespan minimization on m unrelated machines in the context
of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a …
of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a …
A truthful mechanism for value-based scheduling in cloud computing
We introduce a novel pricing and resource allocation approach for batch jobs on cloud
systems. In our economic model, users submit jobs with a value function that specifies …
systems. In our economic model, users submit jobs with a value function that specifies …