We survey the literature on dynamic elections in the traditional settings of spatial
preferences and rent seeking under perfect and imperfect monitoring of politicians. We …

It has been established that opportunistic incumbent politicians, both elected and appointed,
adjust public policies in systematic ways over political cycles. We show that the corrupt …

Opportunism is prevalent in political competition and public policy making. This paper
investigates how opportunism is mitigated by capabilities among city leaders in China …

We present a model of political budget cycles in which incumbents influence voters by
targeting government spending to specific groups of voters at the expense of other voters or …

Recent literature on transparency claims that e-government-enabled transparency through
websites may be conditioned by political and social factors. Being more transparent while …

I study elections between citizen-candidates who cannot make binding policy commitments
before taking office, but who are accountable to voters due to the possibility of re-election. In …

This paper contributes to the growing literature on the links between political regimes and
economic development by studying the effects of years in office on economic development …

This paper studies a setting where a relatively uninformed voter holds a policymaker
accountable through an informed intermediary. In equilibrium the voter uses the …

This paper studies the effects of asymmetries in re-election probabilities across parties on
public policy and their subsequent propagation to the economy. The struggle between …

We study how career concerns affect the dynamics of incentives in a multi-period contract,
when the agent's productivity is a stochastic function of his past productivity and investment …