A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer
We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …
Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-
bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results …
bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results …
[PDF][PDF] No-regret learning in bilateral trade via global budget balance
Bilateral trade models the problem of intermediating between two rational agents—a seller
and a buyer—both characterized by a private valuation for an item they want to trade. We …
and a buyer—both characterized by a private valuation for an item they want to trade. We …
Approximately efficient bilateral trade
We study bilateral trade between two strategic agents. The celebrated result of Myerson and
Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and weakly …
Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and weakly …
Bilateral trade: A regret minimization perspective
N Cesa-Bianchi, T Cesari… - Mathematics of …, 2024 - pubsonline.informs.org
Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating
between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they …
between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they …
A regret analysis of bilateral trade
Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating
between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they …
between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they …
Efficient two-sided markets with limited information
A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful
mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting …
mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting …
An online learning theory of brokerage
We investigate brokerage between traders from an online learning perspective. At any round
$ t $, two traders arrive with their private valuations, and the broker proposes a trading price …
$ t $, two traders arrive with their private valuations, and the broker proposes a trading price …
Approximately efficient two-sided combinatorial auctions
We develop and extend a line of recent work on the design of mechanisms for two-sided
markets. The markets we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and …
markets. The markets we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and …
Muda: A truthful multi-unit double-auction mechanism
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions,
attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the …
attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the …