Implementation theory
E Maskin, T Sjöström - Handbook of social Choice and Welfare, 2002 - Elsevier
The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such
that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social …
that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social …
Incentive-compatible mechanisms for pure public goods: A survey of experimental research
Y Chen - Handbook of experimental economics results, 2008 - Elsevier
Publisher Summary The presence of public goods seriously challenges traditional or
“natural” solutions for the allocation of private goods. Important policy questions, of whether …
“natural” solutions for the allocation of private goods. Important policy questions, of whether …
Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing
WH Sandholm - The Review of Economic Studies, 2002 - academic.oup.com
We consider an implementation problem faced by a planner who manages a roadway
network. The problem entails both hidden information and hidden actions. We solve the …
network. The problem entails both hidden information and hidden actions. We solve the …
Markets, governments, and the “new” political economy
RP Inman - Handbook of public economics, 1987 - Elsevier
Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on the micro-economic reasons for market failure
and the micro-political analysis of government performance. Governments provide goods …
and the micro-political analysis of government performance. Governments provide goods …
[图书][B] Public goods: theories and evidence
RG Batina, T Ihori - 2005 - books.google.com
This book is a broad survey of the literature on public goods. There has been an explosion
of research in the last ten years in a broad variety of-eas in this literature and the time seems …
of research in the last ten years in a broad variety of-eas in this literature and the time seems …
Learning and incentive-compatible mechanisms for public goods provision: An experimental study
Y Chen, FF Tang - Journal of Political Economy, 1998 - journals.uchicago.edu
This is the first systematic experimental study of the comparative performance of two
incentive-compatible mechanisms for public goods provision: the basic quadratic …
incentive-compatible mechanisms for public goods provision: the basic quadratic …
The Groves-Ledyard mechanism: An experimental study of institutional design
Y Chen, CR Plott - Journal of Public Economics, 1996 - Elsevier
The Groves-Ledyard mechanism theoretically can solve the 'free-rider'problem in public
good provision in certain environments. Two questions are of overriding importance in …
good provision in certain environments. Two questions are of overriding importance in …
Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept
used in social choice theory. Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T …
used in social choice theory. Saijo, Sjöström and Yamato [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T …
Learning dynamics for mechanism design: An experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
PJ Healy - Journal of Economic Theory, 2006 - Elsevier
In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, incomplete information and dynamic
behavior may affect the realized outcomes of mechanisms known to be efficient in a …
behavior may affect the realized outcomes of mechanisms known to be efficient in a …
A behavioral model for mechanism design: Individual evolutionary learning
J Arifovic, J Ledyard - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2011 - Elsevier
We are interested in how Groves–Ledyard mechanisms perform when used repeatedly in a
sequence of one-shot games where agents know only their own preferences. In particular …
sequence of one-shot games where agents know only their own preferences. In particular …