Doubly optimal no-regret learning in monotone games
We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms
have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games;(2) lacking …
have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games;(2) lacking …
No-regret learning dynamics for extensive-form correlated equilibrium
The existence of simple, uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to correlated
equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems …
equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems …
Meta-learning in games
In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a
single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions--ranging from routing …
single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions--ranging from routing …
Near-Optimal -Regret Learning in Extensive-Form Games
I Anagnostides, G Farina… - … Conference on Machine …, 2023 - proceedings.mlr.press
In this paper, we establish efficient and uncoupled learning dynamics so that, when
employed by all players in multiplayer perfect-recall imperfect-information extensive-form …
employed by all players in multiplayer perfect-recall imperfect-information extensive-form …
Extra-newton: A first approach to noise-adaptive accelerated second-order methods
K Antonakopoulos, A Kavis… - Advances in Neural …, 2022 - proceedings.neurips.cc
In this work, we propose a universal and adaptive second-order method for minimization of
second-order smooth, convex functions. Precisely, our algorithm achieves $ O (\sigma/\sqrt …
second-order smooth, convex functions. Precisely, our algorithm achieves $ O (\sigma/\sqrt …
Last-iterate convergence with full and noisy feedback in two-player zero-sum games
This paper proposes Mutation-Driven Multiplicative Weights Update (M2WU) for learning an
equilibrium in two-player zero-sum normal-form games and proves that it exhibits the last …
equilibrium in two-player zero-sum normal-form games and proves that it exhibits the last …
No-regret learning in dynamic competition with reference effects under logit demand
This work is dedicated to the algorithm design in a competitive framework, with the primary
goal of learning a stable equilibrium. We consider the dynamic price competition between …
goal of learning a stable equilibrium. We consider the dynamic price competition between …
Curvature-independent last-iterate convergence for games on riemannian manifolds
Numerous applications in machine learning and data analytics can be formulated as
equilibrium computation over Riemannian manifolds. Despite the extensive investigation of …
equilibrium computation over Riemannian manifolds. Despite the extensive investigation of …
A geometric decomposition of finite games: Convergence vs. recurrence under exponential weights
In view of the complexity of the dynamics of learning in games, we seek to decompose a
game into simpler components where the dynamics' long-run behavior is well understood. A …
game into simpler components where the dynamics' long-run behavior is well understood. A …
Payoff-based learning of nash equilibria in merely monotone games
T Tatarenko, M Kamgarpour - IEEE Transactions on Control of …, 2024 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We address learning Nash equilibria in convex games under the payoff information setting.
We consider the case in which the game pseudo-gradient is monotone but not necessarily …
We consider the case in which the game pseudo-gradient is monotone but not necessarily …