Analysis and interventions in large network games
F Parise, A Ozdaglar - Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and …, 2021 - annualreviews.org
We review classic results and recent progress on equilibrium analysis, dynamics, and
optimal interventions in network games with both continuous and discrete strategy sets. We …
optimal interventions in network games with both continuous and discrete strategy sets. We …
[图书][B] Social and economic networks
MO Jackson - 2008 - nber.org
Social'and'Economic' Networks' Page 1 Social'and'Economic' Networks' ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Matthew O.
Jackson Copyright: Matthew O. Jackson 2014 Please do not post or distribute without …
Jackson Copyright: Matthew O. Jackson 2014 Please do not post or distribute without …
Mean field games and applications
This text is inspired from a “Cours Bachelier” held in January 2009 and taught by Jean-
Michel Lasry. This course was based upon the articles of the three authors and upon …
Michel Lasry. This course was based upon the articles of the three authors and upon …
Robust mechanism design
D Bergemann, S Morris - Econometrica, 2005 - JSTOR
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment
among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying mechanism design on …
among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying mechanism design on …
Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: An extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness
There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with
much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game …
much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game …
Strategy-proofness in the large
EM Azevedo, E Budish - The Review of Economic Studies, 2019 - academic.oup.com
We propose a criterion of approximate incentive compatibility, strategy-proofness in the
large (SP-L), and argue that it is a useful second-best to exact strategy-proofness (SP) for …
large (SP-L), and argue that it is a useful second-best to exact strategy-proofness (SP) for …
The disparate equilibria of algorithmic decision making when individuals invest rationally
The long-term impact of algorithmic decision making is shaped by the dynamics between the
deployed decision rule and individuals' response. Focusing on settings where each …
deployed decision rule and individuals' response. Focusing on settings where each …
Aggregate comparative statics
D Acemoglu, MK Jensen - Games and Economic Behavior, 2013 - Elsevier
In aggregative games, each playerʼs payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate
of the actions of all the players. Many common games in industrial organization, political …
of the actions of all the players. Many common games in industrial organization, political …
Mechanism design in large games: Incentives and privacy
We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings
of incomplete information, and address this problem using" recommender mechanisms." A …
of incomplete information, and address this problem using" recommender mechanisms." A …
[PDF][PDF] Strategic 'mistakes': Implications for market design research
Using a rich data set on Australian college admissions, we show that even in strategically
straightforward situations, a non-negligible fraction of applicants adopt strategies that are …
straightforward situations, a non-negligible fraction of applicants adopt strategies that are …