Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots,
delivery routes, network routing, and furniture. Because of complementarities or substitution …

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield
inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous …

In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal
utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such buyers. The valuations of …

A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction
of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to …

The authors show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several
combinatorial problems where each agent's secret data is naturally expressed by a single …

This article proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous
commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders …

We show that any communication finding a value-maximizing allocation in a private-
information economy must also discover supporting prices (in general personalized and …

A fundamental problem in building open distributed systems is to design mechanisms that
compute optimal system-wide solutions despite the self-interest of individual users and …

Combinatorial auctions have two features that greatly affect their design: computational
complexity of winner determination and opportunities for cooperation among competitors …

We solve a shortest path problem that is motivated by recent interest in pricing networks or
other computational resources. Informally, how much is an edge in a network worth to a user …