We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker
communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages …

We study a model of Bayesian persuasion in which Receiver has limited information-
processing capacity, or attention, and must exert costly effort to process Sender's signals …

This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems
when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective …

We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of
Bayesian persuasion. We first characterize the optimal signal in the prosecutor-judge game …

Equilibrium models of costless strategic communication provide four insights, which can be
summarized informally by: failure to communicate is always possible; perfect communication …

This paper combines a survey of existing literature in game-theoretic pragmatics with new
models that fill some voids in that literature. We start with an overview of signaling games …

We investigate the problem of strategic point-to-point communication with side information at
the decoder, in which the encoder and the decoder have mismatched distortion functions …

Motivated by collaboration in human and human-robot groups, we consider designing lossy
source codes for agents in networks that are in different statistical environments but also …

In this article, we investigate strategic information transmission over a noisy channel. This
problem has been widely investigated in Economics, when the communication channel is …

Communication is rarely perfect, but rather prone to error of transmission and reception.
Often the origin of these errors cannot be properly quantified and is thus imprecisely known …