Publisher Summary This chapter focuses on the bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus. The
theory of the bargaining set answers a more modest question: How would or should the …

Let P be a real-valued function defined on the space of cooperative games with transferable
utility, satisfying the following condition: In every game, the marginal contributions of all …

This paper examines the problem of measuring intellectual influence based on data on
citations between scholarly publications. We follow an axiomatic approach and find that the …

A cooperative venture yields a nonnegative surplus. Agents are differentiated by their
opportunity costs only. Two surplus sharing methods (equal sharing, proportional sharing) …

Publisher Summary The core is, the most intuitive solution concept in cooperative game
theory. An intuitively acceptable axiom system for the core might reinforce its position as the …

A new value is defined for n-person hyperplane games, ie, non-sidepayment cooperative
games, such that for each coalition, the Pareto optimal set is linear. This is a generalization …

Today, the heads of federal and municipal authorities, the managers of corporations,
industrial enterprises, and organizations (Principals) face a wide variety of aims and tasks …

This is a study of the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and
resource allocation. It begins with a user's guide. This guide first describes the components …

In an axiomatic bargaining model with a variable number of agents, a stability axiom due to
Harsanyi is used to give a characterization of the Nash bargaining solution without …

In this book, Professor Thomson and Professor Lensberg extrapolate upon the Nash (1950)
treatment of the bargaining problem to consider the situation where the number of …