The limits of ex post implementation without transfers

T Feng, A Niemeyer, Q Wu - Theoretical Economics, 2023 - Wiley Online Library
We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers
cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the …

The Division Problem of Chances

R Ramezanian - arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.16836, 2024 - arxiv.org
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their
choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have …

Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

S Barberà, D Berga, B Moreno - Games and Economic Behavior, 2022 - Elsevier
We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that
when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post …

Compromising Between Random Priority and Probabilistic Serial Mechanism

R Ramezanian - Available at SSRN 4848895, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
Two well-known mechanisms for random matchings are the Random Priority mechanism
(RP) and the Probabilistic Serial mechanism (PS). Both RP and PS are fair in terms of the …