Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to
simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of …

We present an incentivized laboratory experiment where a random sample of individuals
playing a series of stag hunt games are forced to make their choices under time constraints …

We survey the recent literature on coordination games, where there is a conflict between risk
dominance and payoff dominance. Our main focus is on models of local interactions, where …

We study the long-run conventions emerging in a stag-hunt game when agents are myopic
best responders. Our main novel assumption is that errors converge to zero at a rate that is …

We consider a model of social coordination and network formation where agents decide on
an action in a coordination game and on whom to form costly links with. We explore the role …

Two issues of algorithmic collusion are addressed in this paper. First, we show that in a
general class of symmetric games, including Prisoner's Dilemma, Bertrand competition, and …

We consider a model where players can actively form a limited number of links with other
players to play a general class of size-dependent coordination games. This class of games …

In this paper we study the typical dilemma of social coordination between a risk-dominant
convention and a payoff-dominant convention. In particular, we consider a model where a …

We introduce evolutionary dynamics for two-action games where agents with diverse
preferences use statistical inference to guide their behavior. We show that the dynamic …

We consider a model of social coordination and network formation where agents decide on
an action in a coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We study the role …