To many, the principal–agent model is the obvious lens through which executive pay should
be viewed. Such a sentiment sits uncomfortably with a large number of empirical studies …

We find that connections CEOs develop with top executives and directors through their
appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud. Appointment‐based CEO …

This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical
underpinnings of a “managerial power” approach to executive compensation. Under this …

This paper examines whether firms manipulating their reported financial results make
suboptimal investment decisions. We examine fixed asset investments for a large sample of …

We investigate the incentives that led to the rash of restated financial statements at the end
of the 1990s market bubble. We find that the likelihood of a misstated financial statement …

Recent frauds have questioned the efficacy of the SEC's enforcement program. We
hypothesize that differences in firms' information sets about SEC enforcement and …

We compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1996–2003 with two …

This paper examines the performance consequences of cutting discretionary expenditures
and managing accruals to exceed analyst forecasts. We show that firms that just beat analyst …

We investigate the empirical relation between corporate governance and stock market
liquidity. We find that firms with better corporate governance have narrower spreads, higher …

Operating performance and stock return results imply that managers who commit fraud
anticipate large stock price declines if they were to report truthfully, which would cause …