This article surveys the literature on principal-agent problems with moral hazard that gained
popularity following the seminal works of Mirrlees (1976), Holmström (1979), and others …

We study optimal dynamic contracting for a firm with multiple workers where compensation
is based on public performance signals and privately reported peer evaluations. We show …

We consider how a firm dynamically allocates business among several suppliers to motivate
them in a relational contract. The firm chooses one supplier who exerts private effort. Output …

Firms in developing countries often face concentrated input markets and contracting
frictions. This paper studies the efficiency of self-enforced long-term relationships between …

We consider a moral hazard problem in which a principal provides incentives to a team of
agents to work on a risky project. The project consists of two milestones of unknown …

Relational contracts-informal self-enforcing agreements sustained by repeated interactions-
are ubiquitous both within and across organizational boundaries. This review highlights …

In this article, we use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of relational contracts on
market efficiency in environments with different degrees of contract enforceability and market …

I analyze a model of production in a competitive environment with heterogeneous firms.
Efficient production requires individuals within the organization to take noncontractible …

We investigate how implicit contracts between firm managers and employees are linked to
the adoption of productivity-enhancing organizational practices. We collect new data on …

This paper investigates the impact of family CEOs on firm organizational choices and the
causes and consequences of these decisions. We focus on second-generation (dynastic) …