Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
Consider object exchange problems when each agent may be endowed with and consume
more than one object. For most domains of preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, the …
more than one object. For most domains of preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, the …
Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
V Manjunath, A Westkamp - Journal of Economic Theory, 2021 - Elsevier
We study the balanced exchange of indivisible objects without monetary transfers when
agents may be endowed with (and consume) more than one object. We propose a natural …
agents may be endowed with (and consume) more than one object. We propose a natural …
Organizing time exchanges: Lessons from matching markets
This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (eg, markets for exchanging
time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several …
time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several …
The parameterized complexity of manipulating Top Trading Cycles
We study the problem of exchange when agents are endowed with heterogeneous
indivisible objects, and there is no money. In this setting, no rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency …
indivisible objects, and there is no money. In this setting, no rule satisfies Pareto-efficiency …
Pareto optimal exchange with indifferent endowments
P Eirinakis, I Mourtos, M Samaris - arXiv preprint arXiv:2104.00465, 2021 - arxiv.org
We investigate a market without money in which agents can offer certain goods (or multiple
copies of an agent-specific good) in exchange for goods of other agents. The exchange …
copies of an agent-specific good) in exchange for goods of other agents. The exchange …