In introductory classes to epistemology, we are taught to distinguish between three different
kinds of knowledge. The first kind is acquaintance knowledge: we know our mothers, our …

What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive
account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not …

Abstract Reductive intellectualists (eg, Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b;
Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this …

Introspective knowledge by acquaintance is (roughly) knowledge we have by being directly
aware of our phenomenally conscious states. In this paper, I argue that introspective …

This chapter has two primary aims. Firstly, the conclusions drawn from Chapters 2–8 will be
situated within a wider context: that of the complicated relationship between …

The paper offers an account of inference. The account underwrites the idea that inference
requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion. I reject views …

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of
knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if …

Abstract The so-called Disability Paradox arises from the apparent tension between the
popular view that disability leads to low well-being and the relatively high life-satisfaction …

One can intentionally do something only if one knows what one is doing while they are
doing it. For example, one can intentionally kill one's neighbor by opening their gas stove …

Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (eg, Stanley & Williamson Journal of
Philosophy 98, 411–44, 2001; Stanley Noûs 45, 207–38, 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard …