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Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments Page 1 Strategyproof
collective choice in economic and political environments YVESS PRUM ONT Universite de …

The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic
versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms …

Some of the basic results and insights of the literature on mechanism design are presented.
In that literature game theoretic reasoning is used to model social institutions as varied as …

Problems of social choice frequently take the following form. There are n voters and a set
K={1, 2, ldots, k} of objects. The voters must choose a subset of K. We define a class of …

We consider the problem of locating facilities in a metric space to serve a set of selfish
agents. The cost of an agent is the distance between her own location and the nearest …

We consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents
who may have private information about their preferences. In such a setting, standard …

We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (eg a road network) based on agents'
single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules …

Abstract Under the “Conservative Equal costs” mechanism to produce a non-excludable
(one-dimensional) public good, each agent reports his demand. The lowest reported …

Due to pressing environmental concerns, there is a global consensus to commit to a
sustainable energy future. Germany has embraced Energiewende, a bold sustainable …