This paper reviews agency theory and its application to accounting issues. I discuss the
formulation of models of incentive problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection …

Key indicators of managerial performance are frequently subjective, that is, they are difficult
to specify and/or verify for contracting purposes. When a principal must rely on subjective …

This paper analyzes the impact of signal-to-noise-ratios and the autocorrelation of a
performance measure on the principal's welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation. We …

This paper considers the desirability of aggregate performance measures in light of the fact
that many individuals' performance incentives are driven by a desire to shape external …

This paper seeks to provide a ranking of information systems in a setting of contingent
monitoring. Control strategies that make the acquisition of additional information conditional …

This paper studies how to assign “monitors” to productive agents in order to generate
signals about the agents' performance that are most useful from a contracting perspective …

Die vorhegende Arbelt wurde 1m Sommersemester 2003 yom Fachberelch
Wlrtschaftswissenschaften der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-UnIversltat Frankfurt am Mam als …

In this paper we draw upon multiple theoretical perspectives and develop a conceptual
framework regarding the role of certification signals in service relationships. The central …

This paper studies the incentive to share information with competition. Information sharing
has a positive aspect in that agents have better prediction. However, it also contains a …

This paper is under construction. Consequently, our current introduction is very utilitarian. It
starkly describes the general nature of the model and the key results. There is only a limited …