Budget constraints are ubiquitous in online advertisement auctions. To manage these
constraints and smooth out the expenditure across auctions, the bidders (or the platform on …

We study the complexity of finding an approximate (pure) Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a
first-price auction with common priors when the tie-breaking rule is part of the input. We …

We study the complexity of computing stationary Nash equilibrium (NE) in n-player infinite-
horizon general-sum stochastic games. We focus on the problem of computing NE in such …

The current state-of-the-art methods for showing inapproximability in PPAD arise from the ε-
Generalized-Circuit (ε-GCIRCUIT) problem. Rubinstein (2018) showed that there exists a …

Public goods games in undirected networks are generally known to have pure Nash
equilibria, which are easy to find. In contrast, we prove that, in directed networks, a broad …

The current state-of-the-art methods for showing inapproximability in PPAD arise from the ɛ-
Generalized-Circuit (ɛ-GCircuit) problem. Rubinstein (2018) showed that there exists a …

First Price Auction is 1-1/e2 Efficient | Journal of the ACM skip to main content ACM Digital
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We introduce a new technique for proving membership of problems in FIXP: the class
capturing the complexity of computing a fixed point of an algebraic circuit. Our technique …

Understanding the convergence properties of learning dynamics in repeated auctions is a
timely and important question in the area of learning in auctions, with numerous applications …

We study the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price
auctions with discrete value distributions and discrete bidding space, under general …